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UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE:
ARE CONFLICTS INHERENT IN EVERY PROVISION?
I. INTRODUCTION
Insurance coverage designed to protect an insured driver who is
injured through the fault of an uninsured or unknown driver is now
available throughout the United States.' A number of states have enacted
legislation making uninsured motorist coverage compulsory.2 Following
this general trend, Montana has recently enacted a statute which provides
that all automobile bodily injury liability insurance policies which are
either issued or delivered in Montana must include provisions for un-
uninsured motorist coverage.3 However, the statute provides that the
insured may reject such coverage.4 Since the language of the Montana
statute appears to be mandatory,5 it is likely that uninsured motorist
coverage will be read into non-complying policies by the courts unless
the insurer can prove that the insured had specifically rejected such
coverage.6 Query, whether or not insurers can force rejection of the un-
insured motorist coverage by the inclusion of a rejection provision in the
policy itself or by requiring a signed rejection of coverage as a condition
precedent to the purchase of liability coverage.
California's compulsory uninsured motorist statute provides that any
rejection of uninsured motorist coverage must be made by supplemental
agreement.7 This requirement of a supplemental agreement guarantees
that any rejection of uninsured motorist coverage will be at the option of
the insured and every automobile liability policy issued in California
will include uninsured motorist coverage in the period between the time
the policy is issued and the time the supplemental rejection agreement
is received by the company. Although Montana's mandatory uninsured
motorist statute does not expressly require a supplemental agreement,
'COUCH, INSURANCE § 45:619 (2d ed. 1964).
'There appears to be a trend to make this coverage compulsory throughout the nation.
California, New York, Illinois, and Oregon are among the 14 other states which have
made this type of coverage mandatory. For a reprint of the various statutes see
Donaldson, Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 34 INSURANCE COUNSEL JOURNAL 57, 79
(1967).
'REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 40-4403 (hereinafter REVISED CODES OF MONTANA
are cited R.C.M.), provides: "No automobile liability . . . policy . .. shall be de-
livered or issued for delivery in this state . . . unless coverage is provided therein
... for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover
damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily
injury, sickness or disease, including death, resulting therefrom; provided, that the
named insured shall have the right to reject such coverage. . . .'I Section 2 of ch. 31,
Montana Laws, 1967, reads: "this act is effective January 1, 1968.'"
'Id.
'R.C.M., 1947, § 40-4403, supra, note 3 provides that "No automobile liability . . .
policy ... shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state .. .unless coverage
is provided [insuring bodily injury caused by uninsured motorists] .... " (Emphasis
added.)
'Wildman v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 48 Cal. 2d 31, 307 P.2d 359, 364
(1957).
7 CAL. INS. CODES § 11580.2 (West 1955). Hendricks v. Merit Plan Insurance Co., 205
Cal. App. 2d 133, 22 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1962).
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the statute does give the option of rejection solely to the insured. R.C.M.
Section 40-4403 reads: ". . . provided, that the named insured shall have
the right to reject such coverage." Therefore, any provision in the policy
itself which states that the insured rejects uninsured motorist coverage
seems to be prohibited by implication. Otherwise, the right of the insured
to reject such coverage would be illusory. By the same reasoning, the re-
quirement of a signed rejection by the prospective insured as a condition
to being able to purchase automobile liability insurance would, in effect,
take away any right of the insured to reject uninsured motorist coverage.
Since practically every insured Montana driver will be provided un-
insured motorist coverage by his insurance carrier beginning January 1,
1968, the legal problems connected with its specialized contract provisions
are likely to increase. 9 Already many cases have added a gloss to the vari-
ous provisions of uninsured motorist coverage. However, it should be noted
that the case law with respect to insurance of this kind has not yet shown
a sufficiently clear trend in many areas to justify statements of well-
settled principles or rules. This comment will point out some of the major
problems likely to occur as a result of the policy provisions and will sug-
gest possible solutions to some of these problems.
II. HISTORY
The constant increase in traffic accidents in this nation and in Montana
has served to intensify the serious social problems of the uncompensated
traffic victims. The necessity of protecting innocent victims from negli-
gent, uninsured and financially irresponsible motorists was reflected in
early financial responsibility legislation. 10 Under Montana's present Fi-
nancial Responsibility Law, a motorist is not required to prove his ability
to pay damages for personal injuries or property damage he may cause
in an automobile accident until after he has had one accident." After the
first accident, the motorist must prove financial responsibility by posting
a bond or by proving that he carries liability insurance. 12 Under this law,
the penalty for failure to prove financial responsibility is the revocation
of the driver's license until such liability insurance is purchased or until
financial responsibility is proved by posting a bond.' 3 Therefore, the first
traffic victim of any given defendant has no assurance of collecting a
8See supra note 3. R.C.M., 1947, §§ 40-3714, 40-3715, allows the Insurance Commission
to approve endorsement forms and require the Commissioner to disapprove any form
filed which is in violation of or does not comply with the code.
'Section 2 of ch. 31, Laws of Montana, 1967, reads: "this act is effective January 1,
1968." Uninsured motorist coverage has been generally available on a voluntary basis
in Montana since approximately 1956.
No influx of cases have occurred to date, however, the insurance industry has pre-
dicted an increase in its "trade" journals. For a good bibliography see Note, Unin-
sured Motorist Coverage-A Survey, 1962 WASH. U.L.Q. 134 at note 4.
"'For a history of state legislation, see Risjord & Austin, The Problem of the Finan-
cially Irresponsible Motorist, 24 U. KAN. CITY L. IRzv. 82 (1955).
"R.C.M., 1947, § 53-401.
1 R.C.M., 1947, § 53-418.
.C.M., 1947, § 53-422.
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judgment. Also the law fails to protect against those who continue to drive
without a license. There is little comfort in knowing that a negligent un-
insured or financially irresponsible motorist will merely lose his driving
privilege while his victims suffer uncompensated losses. For these reasons
Montana adopted mandatory uninsured motorist coverage to supplement
the existing financial responsibility laws.
14
The general uninsured motorist coverage in use in Montana is patterned
after provisions drafted by the National Bureau of Casualty Under-
writers.16 The insuring provision of this endorsement agrees:
To pay all the sums which the insured ... shall be legally entitled
to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured
automobile because of bodily injury . . . sustained by the mainte-
nance or use of such uninsured automobile; provided . .. determina-
tion as to whether the insured . . . is legally entitled to recover such
damages, and if so, the amount thereof, shall be made by agreement
between the insured and the company or, if they fail to agree, by
arbitration.17
Usually all recovery under the uninsured motorist coverage is lim-
ited to bodily injury; property damage coverage is not included.' 8 In
view of the diversity of the insurance industry and the large number
of companies now writing uninsured motorist coverage, many policy
provisions may be slightly different from Bureau policy provisions or
from the endorsement set out in the appendix to this comment. However,
the basic purpose of uninsured motorist coverage is uniform regardless
of the wording of the policy provisions. That purpose is to provide pro-
tection for the automobile insurance policy-holder against the risk of
inadequate compensation for injuries or death caused by the negligence
of financially irresponsible drivers, and to place an injured policy holder
in the same position he would have been if the tort-feasor had carried
minimum limits of liability insurance.' 9
III. ARBITRATION CLAUSES
As outlined in the typical uninsured motorist provision, when the
insured has been injured in an automobile accident and discovers that the
14See supra note 2.
15For a complete history of the Uninsured Motorist Endorsement see: Plummer, The
Uncompensated Automobile Accident Victim, 24 INS. COUNSEL J. 78, 83 (1957);
George, Insuring Injuries Caused by Uninsured Motorists, 1956 INS. L. J. 715.
18The endorsement is Part IV of the Standard Provisiotls For Automobile Combination
Policies, Family Automobile Form, First Revision, May 1, 1958; prepared by the
National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters, 125 Maiden Lane, New York, 38, New York.
"1Id. See also the endorsement form set out in the appendix to this comment under
"Insuring Agreement #1." This form was provided by Safeco Insurance Company
of America, Seattle, Washington, endorsement form T-1861 5/67. (Reprinted by
permission).
"-R.C.M., 1947, § 40-4403 does not require inclusion of property damage coverage. How-
ever, property damage coverage is provided in Virginia and South Carolina. S.C. CODE
ANN. § 46-750, 33 (1962); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-381 B (Supp. 1958).
"Peterson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 238 Or. 106, 393 P.2d 651
(1964); McCarthy v. Motor Vehicle Ace. Indemnification Corp., 16 App. Div. 2d 35,
224 N.Y.S.2d 909 (1962); Annot: "Uninsured Motorist'' 79 ALR 2d 1252 (1961).
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adverse party has no liability insurance, the insured must notify his in-
surer.20 The insurer then begins an investigation of the accident and if
the adverse party was "uninsured" according to policy provisions, the
insurer attempts to settle with the insured the questions of liability21 and
damages. 22 If the insurer and the insured do not reach agreement as to
the questions of liability or damages, both parties are given the option
of requesting arbitration. 23 Either party may initiate arbitration by send-
ing the other written notice of "Demand for Arbitration", and by filing
two copies of the notice with the Ameriean Arbitration Association. 24
Also, the typical policy provides that any judgment obtained against the
adverse party without permission of the insurer will not be conclusive
against the insurer.25 In fact, submitting to arbitration after failure
to agree is a condition precedent to the insurer's liability.26 The policy
provides that no action can be taken against the insurance company
unless all policy conditions are fully complied withy.2  According to the
arbitration clause, the insured and the insurer agree to be bound by any
award made by the arbitrators.28
A significant question arises when the arbitration clause is chal-
lenged as a bargain or contract to relinquish one's right to resort to the
courts. 29 At common law an agreement to arbitrate a future dispute was
regarded as an attempt by private parties to oust the jurisdiction of the
courts and held void.30 This common law doctrine is followed in many
nThe notice requirement is usually part of the insuring agreement found in the prin-
cipal insuring contract.
nIn Application of Zurich Insurance Company, 14 App. Div. 2d 669, 219 N.Y.S. 2d 748
(1961), the court gave greater scope to the arbitration clause by recognizing the
clause may extend to questions of law and fact other than negligence and the question
of damages. For instance, law and facts which may affect the eligibility of the insured
to recover. See also Application of American National Fire Insurance Co., 15 Misc. 2d
692, 182 N.Y.S.2d 899 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
21See appendix "A", "Insuring Agreement" number 1.
2See appendix "A'', ''Insuring Agreement" number 1 and ''condition" number 8.
2tId.
'See supra note 21.
23See appendix ''A'' ''Condition'' number 8.
"See appendix "A'' ''Condition'' number 14.
nSee supra note 25.
2The common law rule is stated as follows:
It is settled at common law that a general agreement in or to a contract to
submit to final determination by arbitrators rights and liabilities of the
parties with respect to any disputes that may thereafter arise under the
contract is voidable at will by either party at any time before a valid
award is made, and will not be enforced by the courts, because of the rule
that private persons cannot by a contract to arbitrate, oust the jurisdiction
of the legally constituted courts. 78 ALR 2d 1292 (1961).
At least 23 jurisdictions have changed the common law rule by statute, however,
such a rule is recognized or codified in Illinois, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Missouri,
and Montana. See 1962 WASH. LAW QUARTERLY 142 for a compilation of statutes
which have changed the common law rule. See also, Hume, Uninsured Motorist Cover-
age, 12 FEDERATION OF INS. COUNSEL Q. 7 (1962) where it is stated that some 23
jurisdictions find arbitration agreements valid and enforceable.30See Note, Contract Clause Providing For Arbitration of Future Disputes Is Not En-
forceable In Montana, 24 MONT. L. REV. 77 (1962).
[Vol. 29
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jurisdictions when interpreting the arbitration clause in uninsured mo-
torist coverage. 3' The decision of Boughton v. Farmers Insurance Ex-
change,3 2 is the leading case holding that an arbitration provision in un-
insured motorist coverage is void. In Boughton, the insured sent the
insurer copies of the complaint against an uninsured motorist and was
advised that the insurer would not pay the insured even if the insured
was successful in his suit against the uninsured motorist. The insured
promptly obtained a judgment against the uninsured tort-feasor and then
sued the insurers under the uninsured motorist coverage. The court held
for the insured primarily on the ground that all stipulations to arbitrate
future controversies are not enforceable because such stipulations deprive
the court of jurisdiction and are contrary to public policy. The court
observed that "the primary and essential part of the contract was insur-
ance coverage, not the procedure for determining liability.'' 33 The court
also found that the so-called "no action clause" (policy provision pro-
viding no action can lie against the insurer unless there has been full
compliance with the terms of the policy) was void. 34 The court reasoned:
In as much as the insured agreed to pay all sums insured shall
be legally entitled to recover from an uninsured motorist and the
"no action" provision could restrict insured from enforcing these
rights, we hold such provision to be void.3 5
Finally, the court held that the judgment which the insured obtained
against the uninsured tort-feasor was conclusive against the insurer on the
issues of liability and damages, since the company had been given notice
of the action.36
The Boughton decision is especially significant in Montana because
its holding was cited for support in the leading Montana case of Dominici
v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.37 The facts of Dominici
were quite similar to those in Boughton. The insurer defended on the
ground that its insured had instituted an action against the uninsured
tort-feasor without written consent of the insurer as required by the
"no judgment clause." ' s  The insured contended that the "no judg-
'See supra note 29.
"-354 P.2d 1085 (Okla. Sup. Ct. 1960).
1354 P.2d at 1089.
'Id.
351d.
"354 P.2d at 1090.
1143 Mont. 406, 390 P.2d A06 (1964). Cf. In re Vanguard Ins. Co., 18 N.Y.2d 376, 275
N.Y.S.2d 515 (1966).
New York damage claimant did not release his insurer from liability under family
protection clause by proceeding against uninsured motorist without insurer's consent
after insurer had repudiated liability, since repudiation constitutes breach of contract.
'The so-called "no judgment clause" which the Montana Supreme Court referred to
in the Dominici decision was actually a policy exclusion whereby the uninsured cover-
age would not apply:
(a) to bodily injury to an insured .. .with respect to which such insured, his
legal representative or any person entitled to payment under this coverage
(if he or they) shall without written consent of the company make any
1968]
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ment clause," which the insurer claimed was an express condition to re-
covery, was void. The Montana Supreme Court held for the insured and
recommended the following rule: 39
In the case at bar, the condition of the company's promise to pay
is the ascertainment of the legal liability of the third party. The
company can prevent this determination by the simple device of
refusing to grant the insured its written consent t6 prosecute the
action to judgment. There was an implied promise on the part of the
Insurance Company that it would not unreasonably or arbitrarily
withhold its written consent. . . . Under these circumstances, the
action of the company in arbitrarily withholding its written con-
sent constitutes a violation of the implied provisions of the policy
and consequently the exclusion clause is not a bar to this action.
In reference to the issue of whether the arbitration clause contained
in the policy was valid the court stated :40
a contract requiring all differences or controversies arising
between the parties as to arbitration will not be allowed to interfere
with, or bar the litigation of such controversies when brought into
court . . . R.C.M. 1947, Section 13-806, makes void contract pro-
visions restricting access to the courts.
The opposite result was reached in Georgia,41 where the insured ob-
tained judgment against the uninsured tort-feasor without the insurer's
consent. The insured then sued the insurer under his uninsured motorist
coverage. The court of appeals reversed a trial verdict for the insured
and held that the insured forfeited his right to recover because the in-
sured violated a policy provision which required consent of the insurer
to sue the uninsured motorist.
42
The question still exists in Montana as to the proper course of action
for an insurance company when its insured sues the uninsured tort-
feasor after an insurer decides to deny coverage. This problem is most
likely to arise when the insurer claims its insured was contributorily negli-
gent in an accident with an uninsured motorist. Assuming the insured
brings a direct suit against the uninsured motorist as permitted by the
Dominici rule,43 the judgment he obtains against the uninsured motorist
may be conclusive against the insurer if proper notice of the suit is given
settlement with or prosecute to judgment any action against any person or
organization who may be legally liable therefore . . .390 P.2d at 807.
The clause in Dominici is slightly different from the appendix endorsement provision
(a) under ''Exclusions."
wLevy v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 175 N.E.2d 607, 610, 611, (1961) is the original
source of the quoted language found in Dominici, supra note 38.
40390 P.2d at 809. See also supra note 30.
41137 S.E.2d 551 (Ga. 1964).
42Cf. Childs v. Allstate Ins. Co. 237 S.C. 455, 117 S.E.2d 867 (1961), where the South
Carolina court held a "no judgment clause" invalid but recognized the validity of
the arbitration clause to determine the amount of damages. See also Wright v.
Fidelity and Casualty Co., 155 S.E.2d 102 (N.C. 1967) where the North Carolina Court
held an action against the uninsured motorist by the insured was not an implied
condition precedent to recovery.
"See text at note 39 supra.
[Vol. 29
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to the insurer. Unless the insurer is allowed to intervene in the lawsuit
between its insured and the uninsured tort-feasor, there is a possibility
that the uninsured tort-feasor may not be able or willing to adequately
defend himself in the lawsuit. 44 Thus the insurer would be held liable in
an action which, if properly defended, may have resulted in a verdict
for the uninsured motorist. In answer to this problem, the Montana court,
in Dominici, suggested intervention by the insurer. The court noted :45
We must admit that this, or any other, insurance carrier is thrown
upon the horns of a dilemma by this interpretation (holding "nojudgment clause" void) of this type of insurance contract. How-
ever, the harshness may be ameliorated through the use of interven-
tion . . . , or possibly a plaintiff's use of joinder.
Intervention or joinder would give the insurance company an opportunity
to take some action in a case which would determine whether there were
facts which would make the insurance company liable on uninsured mo-
torist coverage. 46
When intervention is allowed to an insurer, additional complications
ensue. If the insurance carrier attempts to prove contributory negligence
against its own insured, a serious problem is raised as to the admissibility
of any evidence obtained by the insurance company in confidence from
its insured. Usually the uninsured mototrist coverage has a provision which
requires the assistance and cooperation of the insured.47 Assuming that
the insured has cooperated with the insurer by revealing the facts of the
accident, should the statements and evidence thus obtained be admissible
in the lawsuit in which the insurer has intervened and is trying to prove
its own insured was contributorily negligent? Probably the insured would
have a sound argument on ethical grounds for the exclusion of such evi-
dence. Another problem arises when an insurance carrier attempts to ex-
tend a defense to the uninsured driver in a suit by the insured against
the uninsured motorist. A conflict of interests may occur when the un-
insured motorist does not want the insurance company's assistance in his
defense. If the uninsured motorist does give permission to the insurer
to defend him against the insured, the insurer may find itself on both
sides of the lawsuit; a situation which California has held to be against
public policy.48
Whenever a claim is made for benefits under uninsured motorist
coverage, the insurance company could possibly be involved in disputes
with their own policy holders and conflicts of interest may arise. One of
"See text at note 36 supra. See also: Note, Uninsured Motorist Coverage: The Hid-
den Arrow-in the Plaintiff's Quiver, 12 DRAKE L. REV. 119 (1963).
'1390 P.2d at 810.
"eState Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Craig, 364 S.W.2d 343, 349 (Mo. App. 1963):
Allowed intervention by the insurer even when the insured argued the insurer had no
''interest'' in the lawsuit.
'7See appendix endorsement clause number 4 under "Conditions," which requires assist-
ance and cooperation.
O'Morrow v. Borad, 27 Cal. 2d 794, 167 P.2d 483 (1946). Cf. Hoffman v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 188 N.Y.S.2d 408 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
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the advantages of arbitration under the uninsured motorist coverage is
avoidance of such potential conflicts. 49 Many states have enacted legislation
which permits enforcement of contractual agreements to arbitrate future
disputes.50 Legislation recognizing the validity of the arbitration clause
in uninsured motorist coverage might eliminate many of the conflicts which
arise under this special type of insurance. Until such legislation is enacted
in Montana, the insured should always scrutinize any evidence used by the
insurer who has intervened in the lawsuit between the insured and the
uninsured tort-feasor to determine whether or not objections as outlined
above can be made to its admission. On the other hand, the insurance car-
rier should always consider intervention whenever an insured files a direct
lawsuit against an uninsured motorist. Otherwise, the insurer may find
that any judgment obtained by the insured against the uninsured motorist
will be conclusive against the insurer, even though the insurer did not have
its day in court. 51
IV. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
In Montana the statute of limitations for a cause of action based
upon tort is three years. 52 The statute of limitations for a cause of action
based upon a written contract is eight years.5 3 Thus it becomes important
to determine whether the underlying nature of an action to collect under
uninsured motorist coverage is contract or tort. This question as to the
nature of the action remains unanswered in Montana.
The obvious relationship that uninsured motorist coverage has to a
tort action is the requirement that the insured must sustain injuries caused
by an uninsured tort-feasor before the insured can claim under the con-
tract with the insurer. The typical uninsured motorist provision states:
. .. the company agrees . . . to pay all sums which the insured
or his legal representative shall be legally entitled to recover as
damages . . .because of bodily injury .... 53
Whether or not the court interprets the insured's right as essentially one
'"Nevertheless, there are conflict problems existing in arbitration. For instance, where
the insuring company obtains the cooperation of the uninsured motorist to establish
a defense in arbitration. It would then be improper for the defense attorney to obtain
any admissions from the uninsured driver and attempt to use them against the un-
insured driver at a later date in subrogation against the uninsured motorist.
5°See supra note 29.
G'See supra notes 32, 37. See also appendix endorsement clause number 1 under "In-
suring Agreements" for a clause which most companies have added since the Boughton
decision:
"No judgment against any person . . . alleged to be legally responsible
for the bodily injury shall be conclusive, as between the insured and the
company, of the issues of liability . . .or of the amount of damage to
which the insured is legally entitled unless such judgment is entered pur-
suant to an action prosecuted by the insured with the written consent of
the company. " I
Whether such a provision will stand the test of judicial scrutiny is yet to be deter-
mined.
52R.C.M., 1947, § 93-2607.
See Appendix ' A' ' Endorsement, "Insuring Agreements'' number 1.
[Vol. 29
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in contract or tort seems to lie in the interpretation by the court of the
phrase "legally entitled to recover."
In a lower New York decision, 54 an insured sued the insurer on a
policy providing uninsured motorist benefits. The insurer argued that since
the accident occurred on March 14, 1956, and no demand was made for
arbitration until May 28, 1959, the insured's claim was barred by the three-
year statute of limitations applicable to tort. The court held that the in-
sured's claim was not based upon a tort, but upon the insurance contract,
although a tortious act of a third party gave rise to the rights under the
contract.55
The primary argument for applying the tort statute of limitation is
based upon the concept that the insured must establish the liability of the
uninsured mototrist before he can recover.56 When the insured permits the
tort statute of limitations to run on his action against the uninsured mo-
torist, the insured is no longer legally entitled to recover from the unin-
sured tort-feasor. The insurer's right of subrogation would then be ef-
fectively destroyed.
A recent South Carolina decision57 held that recovery under unin-
sured motorist coverage is subject to the condition that the insured estab-
lish legal liability on the part of the uninsured tort-feasor. After the tort-
feasor's liability is established through a judgment, a direct action can
be brought by the insured to recover from the insurer on his uninsured
motorist coverage. Therefore, under the South Carolina rule, if the insured
fails to establish liability of the uninsured motorist before the tort statute
of limitations runs, he loses his cause of action against the insurance com-
pany.
Counsel for the insured may be well advised not to let the three year
tort statute of limitations run against the uninsured motorist tort-feasor
until this question is finally resolved in Montana. Counsel for the insurer
should also encourage the filing of an action by the insured against the
uninsured tort-feasor within the three year tort statute of limitation period
if settlement is not made with the insured before that time. Otherwise,
either the insured will lose his right against the insurance company, if the
court holds the tort statute of limitations controls; or, the insurer will lose
any right to subrogation58 against the uninsured tort-feasor, if the court
applies the contract statute of limitations.
"Application of Ceccarelli, 204 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct. 1960); accord. Application of
Travelers Indemnity Company, 226 N.Y.S.2d (Sup. Ct. 1962).
5See Doe v. Brown, 203 Va. 508, 125 S.E.2d 159 (1962), where the Virginia court
held that an action by an insured for uninsured motorist benefits was cx delicto since
the cause of action arises out of tort and thus a five day statutory notice requirement
which was a type of statute of limitations would apply to a suit by the insured against
his insurer for uninsured motorist benefits.
TORemsen v. Midway Liquors, Inc., 30 Ill. App. 2d 132, 174 N.E.2d 7 (1961).
"
7Laird v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 243 S.C. 388, 134 S.E.2d 206 (1964); see also COUCH,
INSURANCE § 45:649 (2d ed. 1964).
Subrogation is discussed in length under the title; Trust Agreement, infra.
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V. SUBROGATION THROUGH THE TRUST AGREEMENT
If the insurer pays a claim to its insured under the uninsured mo-
torist coverage, the insurer may attempt to recoup the amount he has paid
to the insured, from the uninsured motorist tort-feasor. In California, when
the insurer pays an uninsured motorist claim, the insurer is subrogated to
the rights of the insured for the amount of its payment to the insured.5 9
However, in absence of a statute such as California's, subrogation to an
insured's personal injury claim would represent a violation of the 'com-
mon law doctrine6" that personal tort claims are not assignable. 61 To avoid
the common law prohibition, the drafters of the uninsured motorist policy
provisions have devised a trust agreement62 which accomplishes the same
result as subrogation. Under the trust agreement the insured agrees that:
In the event of payment to any person under this endorsement ...
the company shall be entitled to the extent of such payment to the
proceeds of any settlement or judgment that may result from the
exercise of any rights of recovery of such person against any per-
son . . . legally responsible for the bodily injury because of which
such payment is made . . . such person shall hold in trust for the
benefit of the company all rights of recovery. . . . (Emphasis
added) 6 3
The contract also provides that the insured will bring an action against
the uninsured tort-feasor upon the request of the insurer. New York has
held that the trust agreement provision, supra, is valid as a subrogation
clause. The New York court analogized the position of the insured to a
constructive trustee for the insurer.6 4 Montana has not judicially de-
termined validity of the trust agreement.
If the Montana court finds the trust agreement valid, a very practical
problem could arise where the insurer pays his insured up to the policy
limits for uninsured motorist coverage. For example if the insurer pays
its insured $10,000, and the insured then recovers a judgment against a
partially solvent uninsured tort-feasor for $50,000, assuming the unin-
sured motorist has $6,000 in collectible assets, how should the $6,000 be
distributed ?
Although research reveals no case support, a possible argument for
the insured might be that the assets of the uninsured motorist should be
pro-rated between the insurer and the insured in proportion to their in-
dividual claims. For instance, using the figures above, the insured and
insurer would share in the collectible assets of the uninsured tort-feasor
according to the ratio of 5 to 1. From th $6,000 in collectible assets, the
"CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(e) (West 1955).
-Wilcox v. Bierd, 330 Ill. 571, 162 N.E. 170 (1928); 3 Am. JuR., Assignments § 30
(1936); Morgen Lesser, Some Legal Aspects of the New York, Uninsured Motorists
Coverage, 28 N.Y.B. BULL. 132 (1956).
6id.
12See appendix endorsement clause number 9 under "Conditions" for the usual trust
agreement.
wId.
"New York Casualty Company v. Sinclair Refining Company, 108 F.2d 65, 71 (10th Cir.
1939).
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insured would receive $5,000 of the collectible assets and the insurer would
receive $1,000.
In contrast to this approach, the insurer would seek to recover the
full amount available. The insurer's primary argument appears to be that
the insured has contractually agreed to allow the insurer a priority to the
uninsured motorist's collectible assets to the extent of any payment made
to the insured.6 5 Furthermore, to allow the insured to assert priority over
the insurer would be allowing a trustee (the insured) the benefits which
belong to the beneficiary of the trust (the insurer). This argument is sup-
ported in the Illinois case of Remsen v. Midway Liquors Inc.66 There, the
uninsured tort-feasor who collided with the insured was intoxicated. The
insurer paid the insured the policy limits of the uninsured motorist cov-
erage. The uninsured motorist coverage contained a provision like the
trust agreement discussed above. The insured then brought an action under
the Dram Shop laws of Illinois against the tavern keeper that served the
intoxicated driver. The insurer intervened in the action and claimed a
right arising from the trust agreement, to recover any amount the insured
might receive from the tavern keeper. The insured contended the trust
agreement was in the nature of an assignment of a personal injury claim
and for this reason was prohibited by statute in the State of Illinois. The
Illinois Court rejected this argument and held the trust agreement to be a
legal subrogation entitling the insurer to any amount recovered by the
insured until the amount that the insurer had paid to the insured plus
attorney fees, was recovered.
The typical trust agreement requires the insured to sue the uninsured
motorist at the request and expense of the insurer. 67 Also, it specifically
provides:
CONDITIONS
... in the event of a recovery, the company shall be reimbursed out
of such recovery for expenses, costs and attorney's fees incurred by
it in connection therewith .... 68
No action shall lie against the company unless ... the insured
... has fully complied with all the terms of this endorsement.69
VI. CONCLUSION
The relatively new uninsured motorist coverage raises problems which
result in part from the ambiguity of some of its policy provisions and in
part from the unique type of coverage it provides. The insured and his
own insurance carrier are apt to be on the opposite sides of a law suit
'See appendix endorsement clause 9 (a) under ''Conditions.''
'Cited supra note 56.
'See appendix endorsement clause 9 (d) under "Conditions.''
6Id.
'See appendix endorsement clause 11 under "Conditions."
"George, Insuring Injuries Caused by Uninsured Motorists, 1956 INs. L.J. 715, 718,
supra note 15, has observed that insurance companies hope to recover 33 11% from
uninsured tortfeasors through subrogation suits in the name of the insured.
1968]
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if the insurance carrier attempts to prove its insured was guilty of
contributory negligence. However, if the insured wins judgment against
the uninsured motorist, they are supposed to be allied against the unin-
sured motorist to recover any collectible assets and finally as one writer
aptly observed :71
Their alliance, however, may be jeopardized by the insured's natural
feelings of hostility towards his recent adversary, the insurance
company, and is likely to be shortlived since a judgment against the
uninsured motorist may set them quarreling over distribution of the
proceeds.
With all its ambiguities, uninsured motorist coverage should help sup-
ply the grave need for protection against the financially irresponsible
driver. The enactment of the mandatory uninsured motorist statute72 by
the Montana legislature reflects the interest of lawmaking bodies for the
extreme problems created by the uncompensated traffic victim. Further-
more, additional types of insurance coverage are now becoming available
in a few states on an experimental basis. These provide benefits to drivers
injured in automobile accidents whether or not the insured driver is at
fault.73 Under this experimental coverage, all auto accident victims would
be guaranteed payment for their medical expenses up to $5,000 per person,
irrespective of fault.74 In addition, all accident victims could elect dis-
ability benefits up to $7,500 in no-fault benefits.75 With more than 85 mil-
lion insured vehicles now congesting United States highways, causing some
14 million accidents and 2 million injuries each year, the public will see
many changes in automobile insurance coverage in the next decade.
7 6
EARL J. HANSON
nRice III, Uninsured Motorist Insurance: California's Latest Answer To the Problem
of the Financially Irresponsible Motorist, 48 CAL. L. REv. 516, 531 (1960).
"See supra note 3.
"Guaranteed Benefits, 44 J. AMER. INs. 2 (1968). Guaranteed Benefits Plan supra at 5,
tells of a plan to provide compensation to victims regardless of fault. Some of the
benefits include:
1. Medical Payments
2. Basic Disability payments
3. Loss of services payments
4. Supplemental Disability payment
5. Medical Impairment Payment
6. Survivor's Loss Payment
(Overall limit of $21,500 per person.)
"'Id.
751d.
"Guaranteed Benefits, supra note 73.
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APPENDIX (A)
DAMAGES FOR BODILY INJURY CAUSED BY UNINSURED AUTOMOBILES
(Herein referred to as Uninsured Motorists)
In consideration of the payment of the premium for this endorsement and subject toall of the terms of this endorsement and the applicable terms of the policy, the com-pany agrees with the named insured as follows:
INSURING AGREEMENTS
1. Damages for Bodily Injury Caused by Uninsured AutomobilesTo pay all sums which the insured or his legal representative shall be legally
entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured auto-mobile because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resultingtherefrom, hereinafter called "bodily injury," sustained by the insured, causedby accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of such un-insured automobile ;provided, for the purposes of this endorsement, determination
as to whether the insured or such representative is legally entitled to recover suchdamages, and if so the amount thereof, shall be made by agreement between theinsured or such representative and the company or, if they fail to agree, by
arbitration.
No judgment against any person or organization alleged to be legally responsiblefor the bodily injury shall be conclusive, as between the insured and the company,of the issues of liability of such person or organization or of the amount ofdamage to which the insured is legally entitled unless such judgment is enteredpursuant to an action prosecuted by the insured with the written consent of the
company.
2. Definitions
(a) "'insured" means:(1) the named insured as stated in the policy and, while residents of the
same household, the spouse of any such named insured and relatives of
either; and(2) any other person while occupying an "insured automobile"; and(3) any person, with respect to damages he is entitled to recover because ofbodily injury to which this endorsement applies sustained by an insured
under (1) or (2) above.The insurance applies separately with respect to each insured, but the application
of the insurance to more than one insured shall not operate to increase thelimits of the company's liability.(b) "insured automobile" means an automobile:(1) described in the declarations of the policy as an insured automobile towhich the bodily injury liability coverage of the policy applies; and(2) while temporarily used as a substitute for an insured automobile as de-
scribed in subparagraph (1) above, when withdrawn from normal usebecause of its breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or destruction; and(3) while being operated by a named insured or by his spouse if a resident
of the same household;
but the term "insured automobile" shall not include:(i) an automobile while used as a public or livery conveyance; or(ii) an automobile while being used without the permission of the owner; or(iii) under subparagraphs (2) and (3) above, an automobile owned by the
named insured; or(iv) under subparagraphs (2) and (3) above, an automobile furnished for the
regular use of the named insured.(c) "uninsured automobile" means:(1) an automobile with respect to the ownership, maintenance or use ofwhich there is, in at least the amounts specified by the financial respon-
sibility law of the state in which the insured automobile is principallygaraged, no bodily injury liability bond or insurance policy applicable
at the time of the accident with respect to any person or organizationlegally responsible for the use of such automobile, or with respect towhich there is a bodily injury liability bond or insurance policy applic-
able at the time of the accident but the company writing the same denies
coverage thereunder; or(2) a hit-and-run automobile as defined:
but the term ''uninsured automobile" shall not include:(i) an insured automobile; or(ii) an automobile which is owned or operated by a self-insurer within the
meaning of any motor vehicle financial responsibility law, motor carrierlaw or any similar law; or
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(iii) an automobile which is owned by the United States of America, Canada,
a state, a political subdivision of any such government or an agency of
any of the foregoing; or(iv) a farm type tractor or equipment designed for use principally off public
roads, except while actually upon public roads.
(d) "hit-and-run automobile" means an automobile which causes bodily injury
to an insured arising out of physical contact of such automobile with the
insured or with an automobile which the insured is occupying at the time of
the accident, provided: (1) there cannot be ascertained the identity of either
the operator or owner of such "hit-and-run automobile"; (2) the insured or
someone on his behalf shall have reported the accident within 24 hours to a
police, peace or judicial officer or to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, and
shall have filed with the company within 30 days thereafter a statement under
oath that the insured or his legal representative has a cause or causes of
action arising out of such accident for damages against a person or persons
whose identity is unascertainable, and setting forth the facts in support there-
of; and (3) at the company's request, the insured or his legal representative
makes available for inspection the automobile which the insured was occupy-
ing at the time of the accident.
(e) Occupying. The word "occupying" means in or upon or entering into or
alighting from.(f) State. The word "state" includes the District of Columbia, a territory or
possession of the United States, and a province of Canada.
3. Policy Period, Territory
This endorsement applies only to accidents which occur on and after the effective
date hereof, during the policy period and within the United States of America,
its territories or possessions, or Canada.
EXCLUSIONS
This endorsement does not apply:
(a) to bodily injury to an insured with respect to which such insured, his legal
representative or any person entitled to payment under this endorsement shall,
without written consent of the company, make any settlement with any person
or organization who may be legally liable therefor;
(b) to bodily injury to an insured while occupying an automobile (other than an
insured automobile) owned by a named insured or any relative resident in the
same household, or through being struck by such an automobile;
(c) so as to inure directly or indirectly to the benefit of any workmen's com-
pensation or disability benefits carrier or any person or organization qualify-
ing as a self-insurer under any workmen's compensation or disability benefits
law or any similar law.
CONDITIONS
1. Policy Provisions. None of the Insuring Agreements, Exclusions or Conditions of
the policy shall apply to the insurance afforded by this endorsement except the
Conditions "Notice'' or ''Notice of Accident,' '"Changes,' '"Assignment,''
''Cancellation'' and ''Declarations.''
2. Premium. If during the policy period the number of insured automobiles owned
by the named insured or spouse changes, such named insured shall notify the
company during the policy period of any change and the premium shall be ad-justed in accordance with the manuals in use by the company. If the earned
premium thus computed exceeds the advance premium paid, such named insured
shall pay the excess to the company; if less, the company shall return to such
named insured the unearned portion paid by such insured.
3. Proof of Claim; Medical Reports. As soon as practicable, the insured or other
person making claim shall give to the company written proof of claim, under oath
if required, including full particulars of the nature and extent of the injuries,
treatment, and other details entering into tl~e determination of the amount pay-
able hereunder. The insured and every other prson making claim hereunder shall
submit to examinations under oath by any person named by the company and
subscribe the same, as often as may reasonably be required. Proof of claim shall
be made upon forms furnished by the company unless the company shall have
failed to furnish such forms within 15 days after receiving notice of claim.
The insured person shall submit to physical examinations by physicians selected
by the company when and as often as the company may reasonably require and he,
or in the event of his incapacity his legal representative, or in the event of his
death his legal representative or the person or persons entitled to sue therefor,
shall upon each request from the company execute authorization to enable the
company to obtain medical reports and copies of records.
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4. Assistance and Cooperation of the Insured. After notice of claim under this
endorsement, the company may require the insured to take such action as may be
necessary or appropriate to preserve his right to recover damages from any person
or organization alleged to be legally responsible for the bodily injury; and in any
action against the company, the company may require the insured to join such
person or organization as a party defendant.
5. Notice of Legal Action. If, before the company makes payment of loss hereunder,
the insured or his legal representative shall institute any legal action for bodily
injury against any person or organization legally responsible for the use of an
automobile involved in the accident, a copy of the summons and complaint or
other process served in connection with such legal action shall be forwarded im-
mediately to the company by the insured or his legal representative.
6. Limits of Liability. (a) The limit of the company's liability under this endorse-
ment shall be the limit of bodily injury liability required by the motor vehicle
financial responsibility law of the state of residence, as shown on the declarations;
(b) any amount payable under the terms of this endorsement because of bodily
injury sustained in an accident by a person who is an insured under this
coverage shall be reduced by
(1) all sums paid on account of such bodily injury by or on behalf of (i)
the owner or operator of the uninsured automobile and (ii) any other
person or organization jointly or severally liable together with such owner
or operator for such bodily injury including all sums paid under Bodily
Injury Liability Coverage of the policy, and
(2) the amount paid and the present value of all amounts payable on account
of such bodily injury under any workmen's compensation law, disability
benefits law or any similar law.
(c) any payment made under this endorsement to or for any insured shall be
applied in reduction of the amount of damages which he may be entitled
to recover from any person insured under the Bodily Injury Liability Cover-
age of the policy.
(d) the company shall not be obligated to pay under this coverage that part of
the damages which the insured may be entitled to recover from the owner or
operator of an uninsured automobile which represents expenses for medical
services paid or payable under the medical payments coverage of the policy.
7. Other Insurance. With respect to bodily injury to an insured while occupying an
automobile not owned by the named insured, the insurance under this endorsement
shall apply only as excess insurance over any other similar insurance available to
such insured and applicable to such automobile as primary insurance, and this
insurance shall then apply only in the amount by which the limit of liability for
this coverage exceeds the applicable limit of liability of such other insurance.
Except as provided in the foregoing paragraph, if the insured has other similar
insurance available to him and applicable to the accident, the damages shall be
deemed not to exceed the higher of the applicable limits of liability of this insur-
ance and such other insurance, and the company shall not be liable for a greater
proportion of any loss to which this coverage applies than the limit of liability
hereunder bears to the sum of the applicable limits of liability of this insurance
and such other insurance.
8. Arbitration. If any person making claim hereunder and the company do not agree
that such person is legally entitled to recover damages from the owner or operator
of an uninsured automobile because of bodily injury to the insured, or do not agree
as to the amount of payment which may be owing under this endorsement, then,
upon written demand of either, the matter or matters upon which such person
and the company do not agree shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with
the rules of the American Arbitration Association, and judgment upon the award
rendered by the arbitrators may be entered in any court having jurisdiction there-
of. Such person and the company each agree to consider itself bound and to be
bound by any award made by the arbitrators pursuant to this endorsement.
9. Trust Agreement. In the event of payment to any person under this endorsement:
(a) the company shall be entitled to the extent of such payment to the proceeds
of any settlement or judgment that may result from the exercise of any
rights of recovery of such person against any person or organization legally
responsible for the bodily injury because of which such payment is made;
(b) such person shall hold in trust for the benefit of the company all rights of
recovery which he shall have against such other person or organization because
of the damages which are the subject of claim made under this endorsement;
(c) such person shall do whatever is proper to secure and shall do nothing after
loss to prejudice such rights;
(d) if requested in writing by the company, such person shall take, through any
representative designated by the company, such action as may be necessary or
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appropriate to recover such payment as damages from such other person or
organization, such action to be taken in the name of such person; in the event
of a recovery, the company shall be reimbursed out of such recovery for
expenses, costs and attorneys' fees incurred by it in connection therewith:
(e) such person shall execute and deliver to the company such instruments and
papers as may be appropriate to secure the rights and obligations of such
person and the company established by this provision.
10. Payment of Loss by the Company. Any amount due hereunder is payable (a) to
the insured, or (b) if the insured be a minor to his parent or guardian, or (c) if
the insured be deceased to his surviving spouse, otherwise (d) to a person author-
ized by law to receive such payment or to person legally entitled to recover the
damages which the payment represents; provided the company may at its option
pay any amount due hereunder in accordance with division (d) hereof.
11. Action Against the Company. No action shall lie against the company unless, as
a condition precedent thereto, the insured or his legal representative has fully
complied with all the terms of this endorsement.
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